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In economics, inflation is a general rise in the price of goods and services in relation to purchasing power. It is an economic phenomenon whereby fiat currency is devalued over time due to an increase in the total money supply.

Prices tend to go up when demand from consumers exceeds the normal capacity of producers to supply goods and services. An excess supply of goods and services tends to put downward pressure on prices.

High inflation undermines the economy's ability to generate long-lasting growth and job creation. Consumers and investors may put off purchases because of uncertainty. High inflation erodes the value of incomes and savings. People on fixed incomes, including the elderly and poor are particularly vulnerable to inflation. Social Security payments are adjusted to inflation.

The common measure for consumers is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Economists prefer a broader measure, the "implicit GDP deflator", which includes the prices of non-consumer items like highways and factories.

In the U.S. the inflation rate was near zero in 2009. CPI (Consumer Price Index) change from previous year



Hyperinflation is out of control inflation and has occurred when there is a massive imbalance between the supply and demand and a complete loss of confidence in the currency. It has occurred when prices are decontrolled by central governments, like in the economic collapse of the USSR, where inflation reached over 1000% in some areas. [1]

The worst episodes of hyperinflation historically have been in Weimar Germany in 1923 (after World War I), Hungary after World War II, and Zimbabwe in the late 2000s.

Politics and inflation

Bruce Bartlett wrote:

Measures of inflation

Main article: Consumer price index

The most widely used measure of inflation is the consumer price index (CPI). It reflects changes in the price of a representative "basket" of goods and services sold:

  • food
  • housing
  • transportation
  • furniture
  • clothing
  • recreation
  • other items

The inflation rate is expressed as a percentage increase in average prices over a year. For example, if the cost of the CPI "basket" rises from $100 one year ago to $102 today, the current inflation rate is 2 per cent. When the CPI rises, the purchasing power of the average consumer's dollar falls.[2]

Very few people seem to know the truth about the Federal Reserve and our monetary system. For whatever reason, this topic simply gets brushed over. Yet, the Federal Reserve and its monetary policy, does play a significant role in each of our lives. After all, the Fed controls the nation's money.

Inflation ... that's prices going up, right? Nope. Inflation is an increase in the money supply, without an equal increase in available goods and services. In other words, it's counterfeiting!

When the Fed "prints" money, it affects your dollar in the same way as a counterfeiter's dollar would - the value of your dollar declines. Prices do increase, but only because the dollar in your pocket isn't as valuable as it was before (meaning it takes more dollars to buy the same goods and services).

Inflation is not a "natural" occurrence either. It's a deliberate act by the Federal Reserve ... to STEAL your wealth. This is not a conspiracy theory. It's "just the facts, ma'am."

The Struggle for the Control of the Nation's Money

David Gordon, Mises Daily

[A History of Money and Banking in the United States: From the Colonial Era to World War II (pdf). By Murray N. Rothbard, edited by Joseph T. Salerno. Mises Institute, 2002. 510 pages.]

Murray Rothbard had a remarkable ability to throw unexpected light on historical controversies. Again and again in his work, he pointed out factors that earlier authors had overlooked. After Rothbard has finished with a topic, we can never see it in the same way again. This talent is much in evidence in the present book, a collection of several long articles by Rothbard that together constitute a comprehensive look at American monetary history for the period indicated in the book's title.

An example will illustrate Rothbard's technique. Everyone knows Lenin's theory of imperialism. Developed capitalist economies, Lenin maintained, characteristically produce more than they can sell domestically. To find an outlet for their surplus goods, capitalists seek markets abroad. Their endeavors bring about a struggle for colonies; thus, the "highest stage" of capitalism is imperialism.

So much is well known; but how did Lenin arrive at this account? Rothbard has unearthed a surprising source. The theory stems ultimately from capitalist supporters of imperialism:

By the late 1890s, groups of theoreticians in the United States were working on what would later be called the "Leninist" theory of capitalist imperialism. The theory was originated, not by Lenin but by advocates of imperialism, centering around such Morgan-oriented friends and brain trusters of Theodore Roosevelt as Henry Adams, Brooks Adams, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, and Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. … The ever lower rate of profit from the "surplus capital" was in danger of crippling capitalism, except that salvation loomed in the form of foreign markets and especially foreign investments. … Hence, to save advanced capitalism, it was necessary for Western governments to engage in outright imperialist or neo-imperialist ventures, which would force other countries to open their markets for American products and would force open investment opportunities abroad. (pp. 209 – 10)

I have concentrated on this detail, not only for its own sake, but because from it, we can see in operation several themes in Rothbard's conception of American financial history. Most obviously, he agrees with Michelet that history is a resurrection of the flesh. Not for him are impersonal trends and forces: history always involves the motives and actions of particular persons. (Professor Salerno, in his excellent introduction, explains the theoretical basis for Rothbard's stress on the particular.)

To illustrate, Rothbard does not confine himself to a general statement of the monopoly capitalist origins of the Leninist theory. He describes in great detail the activities of Charles Conant, a leading advocate of imperialism. Conant, it transpires, did much more than theorize. He actively worked to install the gold-exchange standard, a key tool of American monetary imperialism, in Latin America and elsewhere. Rothbard describes Conant's activities in his unique style: "Conant, as usual, was the major theoretician and finagler" (p. 226).

Neither as theorist nor practitioner did Conant act on his own, and to see why not enables us to grasp a central plank of Rothbard's edifice:

Nor should it be thought that Charles A. Conant was the purely disinterested scientist he claimed to be. His currency reforms directly benefited his investment banker employers. Thus, Conant was treasurer, from 1902 to 1906, of the Morgan-run Morton Trust Company of New York, and it was surely no coincidence that Morton Trust was the bank that held the reserve funds for the governments of the Philippines, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, after their respective currency reforms. (pp. 232 – 33)

Rothbard maintains that the House of Morgan held effective control of the American government for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, down to the onset of Roosevelt's New Deal in 1933. He traces in detail Morgan backing for a central bank, culminating in the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.

Through an overwhelming mass of detail, Rothbard makes his case; but a question here arises. Why did the Morgan interests (or anyone else, for that matter) wish to establish a central banking system?

Our author explains the main reason in great detail. A central banking system vastly increases the ability of bankers to lend more money than they possess in reserves. Absent central control, monetary expansion in a fractional reserve system faces limits. If a bank, desiring to increase its profits, expands too much, rival banks will call in its notes. If it cannot meet its obligations, it will collapse. A central banking system removes this obstacle.

The House of Morgan was by no means the first group in American history to seek the ill-gotten gains of centralized banking; Rothbard discusses in great detail, e.g., the struggles over the First and Second Banks of the United States.

Throughout his narrative, Rothbard stresses a point vital to the understanding of monetary history: A popular belief holds that poor people, likely to be in debt, favor easy money, while their rich creditors oppose it. Often, this turns out to be the reverse of the truth.

Debtors benefit from inflation and creditors lose; realizing this fact, older historians assumed that debtors were largely poor agrarians and creditors were wealthy merchants and that therefore the former were the main sponsors of inflationary nostrums. But of course, there are no rigid "classes" of creditors and debtors; indeed, wealthy merchants and land speculators are often the heaviest debtors. (p. 58)

Bankers, then, favor monetary expansion; but why should the rest of us oppose it? Do we not require an "elastic" currency to deal with the failure of prices quickly to adjust to changing business conditions? Not at all, answers Rothbard. "As 'Austrian' business cycle theory has pointed out, any bank credit inflation creates conditions of boom-and-bust" (p. 94).

"Suppose all this is true," we can imagine an expansionist protesting. "Do we not still need monetary expansion to rescue us from recession?" Rothbard demurs; in his view, the business liquidations that accompany recessions are precisely the cure for the preceding boom. Efforts to interfere with these liquidations through inflation will induce another cycle.

Although Austrian theory provides the framework for Rothbard's history, its intricacies are not at the heart of the book. Let us then return to what I found the book's most valuable historical contribution, the discussion of the Morgan bank and its influence.

Rothbard makes clear that the Morgan interests aimed at much more than profits. To this very powerful group, the interests of Great Britain and her empire were paramount; and the Morgan bank constantly aimed to subordinate the interests of the United States to this superior power. After the onset of World War I,

[t]he Morgans played a substantial role in bringing the United States into the war on Britain's side, and, as head of the Fed, Benjamin Strong obligingly doubled the money supply to finance America's role in the war effort. (p. 270)

Rothbard's point serves to introduce a story within the larger story of Morgan influence. Benjamin Strong, the governor of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, was by far the most influential figure in the entire Federal Reserve System from its inception until his death in 1928. He entered into close association with Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England. Both men had enlisted in the Morgan camp:

While the close personal relations between Strong and Norman were of course highly important for the collaboration that formed the international monetary world of the 1920s, it should not be overlooked that both were intimately bound to the House of Morgan. (p. 374)

At Norman's behest, Strong inflated the US monetary supply in order to enable Britain to maintain in operation the gold-exchange standard. By doing so, Rothbard claims, Strong bears heavy responsibility for the onset of the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing depression.

The United States inflated its money and credit in order to prevent inflationary Britain from losing gold to the United States, a loss which would endanger the new, jerry-built "gold standard" structure. The result, however, was eventual collapse of money and credit in the US and abroad, and a worldwide depression. Benjamin Strong was the Morgans' architect of a disastrous policy of inflationary boom that led inevitably to bust. (p. 271)

Rothbard goes even further in his assault on Federal Reserve inflationism. Contrary to Milton Friedman, the Federal Reserve did not follow a contractionist policy once the depression began. Rothbard assails that

the spuriousness of the monetarist legend that the Federal Reserve was responsible for the great contraction of money from 1929 to 1933. On the contrary, the Fed and the administration tried their best to inflate, efforts foiled by the good sense, and by the increasing mistrust of the banking system, of the American people. (p. 275)

The book's narrative is a complex one, and by no means reduces to an account of the vicissitudes of the House of Morgan. A rival banking group, consisting most importantly of Rockefeller interests, challenged it for supremacy. For Rothbard, the New Deal can best be viewed as the victory of the Rockefeller group. (Although the Morgans recovered some of their influence after the mid-1930s, they henceforward occupied a subordinate position.)

Throughout the book, Rothbard pursues with tenacity a biographical method of analysis that stresses the ties of influential figures to central financial groups, such as the Morgans. In his intricate tracing of patrons and clients, Rothbard brings to mind the great works of Ronald Syme and Lewis Namier.

But Rothbard has the advantage over these renowned historians in that he does not restrict himself to the amassing of biographical detail. He has in addition a carefully worked out theory, Austrian economics, to guide him. I have endeavored in this review to mirror Rothbard's constant movement between detail and general theory, but I have at best been able to provide a small taste of this outstanding book."

Fair Use Sources:


- Mayer Amschel Rothschild (Head of the Jewish Rothschild elitist banking-finance family)


See Also

Common Financial Investments

Common Investments in Survivalism

Main article Invest in tangibles

Risk to Investments


Support for your Investments


  1. [1] Inflation Indicators Ukraine
  2. Wanniski, Jude. "Money and Tax Rates." In Wanniski. The Way the World Works. 1978.

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